论文标题
与客户动态选择其服务持续时间的客户对单服务器队列的监管
Regulation of a single-server queue with customers who dynamically choose their service durations
论文作者
论文摘要
近年来，关于与选择服务期限的客户排队模型的研究越来越多。通常，现有文献中的模型假设暗示着每个客户进入服务职位时都会知道自己的服务需求。显然，该属性与某些现实生活中的情况不一致。因此，在此问题的动机上，这项工作包括与动态选择其服务持续时间的客户的单服务器排队模型。在此设置中，它显示了如何得出价格调节（Pigouvian税），这意味着从社会角度出发的最佳资源分配。特别是，这项工作包括用于计算此价格函数参数的有效过程。
In recent years, there is a growing research about queueing models with customers who choose their service durations. In general, the model assumptions in the existing literature imply that every customer knows his service demand when he enters into the service position. Clearly, this property is not consistent with some real-life situations. Thus, motivated by this issue, this work includes a single-server queueing model with customers who dynamically choose their service durations. In this setup, it is shown how to derive a price-regulation (Pigouvian tax) which implies an optimal resource allocation from a social point of view. In particular, this work includes an efficient procedure for computation of the parameters of this price function.
