论文标题
及时更新的非合作多重访问游戏
A Non-Cooperative Multiple Access Game for Timely Updates
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个自私节点网络，该网络希望最大程度地减少其他节点的更新年龄。节点使用基于CSMA/CA的访问机制通过共享频谱发送他们的更新。我们将结果竞争模拟为一种非合件的单次多访问游戏，并调查了两个不同的中等访问设置的平衡策略（a）碰撞比成功的传输较短，并且（b）碰撞更长。我们调查CSMA/CA插槽中的竞争，该节点可能会选择传输或保持闲置。我们发现中等访问设置会对节点产生强大的激励效果。我们表明，当碰撞较短时，传输是一个弱的统治策略。这导致所有节点在CSMA/CA插槽中传输，因此可以保证碰撞。相反，当碰撞更长时，在插槽开始时不存在弱主导策略，在某些条件下，我们得出了混合策略NASH平衡。
We consider a network of selfish nodes that would like to minimize the age of their updates at the other nodes. The nodes send their updates over a shared spectrum using a CSMA/CA based access mechanism. We model the resulting competition as a non-cooperative one-shot multiple access game and investigate equilibrium strategies for two distinct medium access settings (a) collisions are shorter than successful transmissions and (b) collisions are longer. We investigate competition in a CSMA/CA slot, where a node may choose to transmit or stay idle. We find that medium access settings exert strong incentive effects on the nodes. We show that when collisions are shorter, transmit is a weakly dominant strategy. This leads to all nodes transmitting in the CSMA/CA slot, therefore guaranteeing a collision. In contrast, when collisions are longer, no weakly dominant strategy exists and under certain conditions on the ages at the beginning of the slot, we derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
