论文标题
Shapley-Shubik功率指数的Axiomatization为输入和输出中有多个批准的游戏指数
Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
论文作者
论文摘要
Shapley-Shubik指数是Shapley价值的专业化，并广泛用于评估委员会制定二进制决策的委员会。它概括为在输入和输出中都具有两个以上批准的决策。相应的游戏称为$（J，K）$简单游戏。在这里，我们为Shapley-Shubik索引$（J，K）$简单游戏以及连续变体提供了新的Axiomatization，可以被视为极限情况。
The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in the input and the output. The corresponding games are called $(j,k)$ simple games. Here we present a new axiomatization for the Shapley-Shubik index for $(j,k)$ simple games as well as for a continuous variant, which may be considered as the limit case.
