论文标题
排名中的议程操作
Agenda-manipulation in ranking
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了委员会治理的敏感性（例如，董事会成立），以集体确定一组替代方案的排名，以操纵对替代方案的顺序进行投票 - 议程操作。我们展示了一种称为插入的议程策略，该策略允许一个自我利益的委员会主席，却不知道如何进行投票以及她有完全了解的情况。具有这种“遗憾”财产的策略的特点是它们的效率以及避免两个直观错误。彼此之间无遗憾的策略的区别是它们如何优先考虑替代方案。插入排序在词典上优先考虑。
We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on -- agenda-manipulation. We exhibit an agenda strategy called insertion sort that allows a self-interested committee chair with no knowledge of how votes will be cast to do as well as if she had complete knowledge. Strategies with this 'regret-freeness' property are characterised by their efficiency, and by their avoidance of two intuitive errors. What distinguishes regret-free strategies from each other is how they prioritise among alternatives; insertion sort prioritises lexicographically.
