论文标题
选举制度和国际贸易政策
Electoral systems and international trade policy
论文作者
论文摘要
我们开发了一个简单的理论游戏一个模型，以分析选举系统与政府在贸易政策中的选择之间的关系。我们表明，国际压力或外国大厅的存在改变了政府对贸易政策的最终决定，而具有比例选举制度的国家的贸易政策比在多数派选举制度的国家中更具保护主义。此外，大堂付出了更多的费用，以影响具有比例代表制度的国家的贸易政策成果。
We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral sys tems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or foreign lobby changes a government's final decision on trade policy, and trade policy in countries with proportional electoral system is more protectionist than in countries with majoritarian electoral system. Moreover, lobbies pay more to affect the trade policy outcomes in countries with proportional representation systems.
