论文标题
简化的BB84量子密钥分布安全防止连贯攻击
Simplified BB84 quantum key distribution secure against coherent attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
令人信服地显示了诱饵状态量子密钥分布（QKD）是确保钥匙交换的核心解决方案。尽管标准BB84协议需要准备和测量两个互补基础的所有状态，这严重限制了其在光子整合和高速系统中的现实生活应用。幸运的是，与在相干攻击下相比，与标准BB84相比，仅发送和接收三个州的简化BB84达到了相同的渐近秘密关键率。在这项工作中，通过巧妙地利用不确定性关系来平滑熵，我们为诱饵状态简化的BB84 QKD提供了有限的键安全界限，以抵抗普遍合成的框架中的连贯攻击。仿真结果表明，与标准BB84相比，即使脉冲总数低至$ 10^{8} $，它也可以达到几乎相同的性能。我们得出的结论是，在大多数常见的实际情况下，简化的BB84可以完全替换标准BB84成为QKD的最佳选择。
Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) has convincingly been shown the core solution to secure key exchange. While standard BB84 protocol needs to prepare and measure all states of two complementary bases, which seriously restricts its real life applications in photonic integration and high speed system. Fortunately, a simplified BB84, only sending and receiving three states, achieves the same asymptotic secret key rate compared with standard BB84 under coherent attacks. In this work, by skillfully exploiting uncertainty relation for smooth entropies, we provide the finite-key security bounds for decoy-state simplified BB84 QKD against coherent attacks in the universally composable framework. Simulation results show that it can also achieve almost the same performance compared with standard BB84 even the total number of pulses is as low as $10^{8}$. We conclude that simplified BB84 can completely replace standard BB84 to be the best choice for QKD in most common practical scenarios.
