论文标题
可靠的频率调节通过车辆到网格：具有牢固约束的编码立法
Reliable Frequency Regulation through Vehicle-to-Grid: Encoding Legislation with Robust Constraints
论文作者
论文摘要
问题定义：车辆到网格通过使电池电池可用于电网，从而提高了私人电动汽车的低利用率。我们制定了一个强大的优化问题，该问题可以最大限度地利用车辆所有者从销售初级频率调节到网格的预期利润，并保证在编码适用立法的功能不确定性集中，所有频率偏差轨迹始终满足所有频率偏差轨迹的市场承诺。忠实地对电池充电期间的能量转换损失进行建模，渲染此优化问题非凸面。方法论/结果：通过利用不确定性集的总单对象属性和确切的线性决策规则重新制定，我们证明了与功能不确定性的这种非convex强大的优化问题相当于可拖动的线性程序。通过使用现实世界数据的广泛数值实验，我们量化了车辆到网格的经济价值，并阐明了车主，聚合机，设备制造商和监管机构的经济激励措施。管理含义：我们发现，对未交付的监管权力的不交付的罚款太低，无法激励车主，无法兑现给电网运营商提供的交付保证。
Problem definition: Vehicle-to-grid increases the low utilization rate of privately owned electric vehicles by making their batteries available to electricity grids. We formulate a robust optimization problem that maximizes a vehicle owner's expected profit from selling primary frequency regulation to the grid and guarantees that market commitments are met at all times for all frequency deviation trajectories in a functional uncertainty set that encodes applicable legislation. Faithfully modeling the energy conversion losses during battery charging and discharging renders this optimization problem non-convex. Methodology/results: By exploiting a total unimodularity property of the uncertainty set and an exact linear decision rule reformulation, we prove that this non-convex robust optimization problem with functional uncertainties is equivalent to a tractable linear program. Through extensive numerical experiments using real-world data, we quantify the economic value of vehicle-to-grid and elucidate the financial incentives of vehicle owners, aggregators, equipment manufacturers, and regulators. Managerial implications: We find that the prevailing penalties for non-delivery of promised regulation power are too low to incentivize vehicle owners to honor the delivery guarantees given to grid operators.
