论文标题
市场设计中资源交换的高效且公平的交易机制
Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for resource exchange in market design
论文作者
论文摘要
我们使用参数化线性方程来开发一种方法来定义市场设计模型中的交易机制。我们的方法擅长解决诸如复杂的end赋或粗糙优先级等因素引起的挑战，同时提供了通过选择方程参数来纳入公平关注的灵活性。将此方法应用于包括分数捐赠交换，基于优先级的分配以及与现有租户的房屋分配在内的模型，我们获得了这些模型中既有效又公平的新机制。
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering flexibility to incorporate fairness concerns through the selection of equation parameters. Applying this method to models including fractional endowment exchange, priority-based allocation, and house allocation with existing tenants, we obtain new mechanisms that are both efficient and fair in these models.
