论文标题
代表纯粹的纳什平衡在论证中
Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们描述了基于论证的正常形式游戏的表示，并演示了如何使用论证来计算纯战略NASH均衡。我们的方法基于Modgil的扩展论证框架。我们证明了它的正确性，证明了它所满足的几种理论属性，并概述了如何使用它来解释某些策略为何对非专家使用的人使用纳什均衡。
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
