论文标题
电力网的成本限制混合攻击
Cost Restrained Hybrid Attacks in Power Grids
论文作者
论文摘要
近年来，电网中级联故障的频繁出现一直受到关注。对我们来说，一个紧迫的任务是了解电网对各种攻击的级联故障脆弱性。我们考虑了功率电网中的成本限制的混合攻击问题，其中节点和链接的目标是有限的总攻击成本。我们根据删除组件的后果和成本为组件（节点或链接）提出了攻击中心度度量。根据考虑的级联故障的宽度，攻击中心性可能是地方或全球攻击中心。凭借攻击中心性，我们进一步提供了贪婪的混合动力攻击，并通过粒子群优化（PSO）框架进行了最佳的混合攻击。 IEEE总线测试数据上的仿真结果表明，最佳混合动力攻击比贪婪的混合动力攻击更有效。此外，我们发现违反直觉的是，当攻击问题中考虑成本限制时，基于局部中心性的算法比全球中心性的算法要好。
The frequent occurrences of cascading failures in power grids have been receiving continuous attention in recent years. An urgent task for us is to understand the cascading failure vulnerability of power grids against various kinds of attacks. We consider a cost restrained hybrid attack problem in power grids, in which both nodes and links are targeted with a limited total attack cost. We propose an attack centrality metric for a component (node or link) based on the consequence and cost of the removal of the component. Depending on the width of cascading failures considered, the attack centrality can be a local or global attack centrality. With the attack centrality, we further provide a greedy hybrid attack, and an optimal hybrid attack with the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) framework. Simulation results on IEEE bus test data show that the optimal hybrid attack is more efficient than the greedy hybrid attack. Furthermore, we find counterintuitively that the local centrality based algorithms are better than the global centrality based ones when the cost constraint is considered in the attack problem.
