论文标题

利用过程变化以保护光子NOC架构免于窥探攻击

Exploiting Process Variations to Secure Photonic NoC Architectures from Snooping Attacks

论文作者

Chittamuru, Sai Vineel Reddy, Thakkar, Ishan G, Pasricha, Sudeep, Vatsavai, Sairam Sri, Bhat, Varun

论文摘要

微孔谐振器(MRS)的紧凑型尺寸和高波长选择性使片上光子网络(PNOCS)在其光子波导中利用密集的波长 - 划分 - 多路复用物(DWDM),因此获得了高芯片芯片芯片芯片数据传输的高型带机器。不幸的是,PNOC中的硬件特洛伊木马可以操纵其MRS的电气驾驶电路,以使MRS在共享光子波导中从相邻波长通道中窥探数据,这引入了严重的安全威胁。本文提出了一个框架,该框架利用基于过程的身份验证特征以及体系结构级的增强功能,以防止单播期间以及PNOC中的多播转移。评估结果表明,我们的框架可以改善各种PNOC架构的硬件安全性,其平均延迟最小的间接最小为14.2%,能量 - 票房产品(EDP)高达14.6%。

The compact size and high wavelength-selectivity of microring resonators (MRs) enable photonic networks-on-chip (PNoCs) to utilize dense-wavelength-division-multiplexing (DWDM) in their photonic waveguides, and as a result, attain high bandwidth on-chip data transfers. Unfortunately, a Hardware Trojan in a PNoC can manipulate the electrical driving circuit of its MRs to cause the MRs to snoop data from the neighboring wavelength channels in a shared photonic waveguide, which introduces a serious security threat. This paper presents a framework that utilizes process variation-based authentication signatures along with architecture-level enhancements to protect against data-snooping Hardware Trojans during unicast as well as multicast transfers in PNoCs. Evaluation results indicate that our framework can improve hardware security across various PNoC architectures with minimal overheads of up to 14.2% in average latency and of up to 14.6% in energy-delay-product (EDP).

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