论文标题
在流行期间集体决策的游戏理论建模
Game-theoretic modeling of collective decision-making during epidemics
论文作者
论文摘要
流行病的传播动力和所传播的人口的集体行为模式被深深交织在一起，而后者可以批判性地影响前者的结果。在此激励的基础上，我们设计了一种简约的游戏理论行为 - 流行性模型，其中现实因素的相互作用塑造了网络上个体决策和流行病的共同发展。尽管这种共同进化是在现实世界中深深交织在一起的，但现有模型将种群行为瞬时地反应性，因此从长远来看无法捕获人类的行为。我们的模型提供了一个统一的框架来建模和预测复杂的新兴现象，包括成功的集体反应，周期性振荡和复兴的流行病暴发。该框架还允许评估不同政策干预措施在确保成功消除爆发的集体响应方面的有效性。提出了两项受实际疾病启发的案例研究，以说明所提出模型的潜力。
The spreading dynamics of an epidemic and the collective behavioral pattern of the population over which it spreads are deeply intertwined and the latter can critically shape the outcome of the former. Motivated by this, we design a parsimonious game-theoretic behavioral--epidemic model, in which an interplay of realistic factors shapes the co-evolution of individual decision-making and epidemics on a network. Although such a co-evolution is deeply intertwined in the real-world, existing models schematize population behavior as instantaneously reactive, thus being unable to capture human behavior in the long term. Our model offers a unified framework to model and predict complex emergent phenomena, including successful collective responses, periodic oscillations, and resurgent epidemic outbreaks. The framework also allows to assess the effectiveness of different policy interventions on ensuring a collective response that successfully eradicates the outbreak. Two case studies, inspired by real-world diseases, are presented to illustrate the potentialities of the proposed model.
