论文标题
欺骗网络对手的一种私人游戏理论方法
A Differentially Private Game Theoretic Approach for Deceiving Cyber Adversaries
论文作者
论文摘要
网络欺骗是通过隐藏或提供不准确的系统信息来误导攻击者的关键方法之一。有两个主要因素限制了现有的网络欺骗方法的现实应用。第一个限制是,假定网络中的系统数是固定的。但是,在现实世界中,系统数量可能会动态更改。第二个限制是文献中简化了攻击者的策略。但是,在现实世界中,攻击者可能比理论所建议的要强大。为了克服这两个局限性,我们提出了一种新颖的私人游戏理论方法来解决网络欺骗。在这种建议的方法中,辩护人采用差异隐私机制来战略性地改变系统的数量并混淆系统的配置,而攻击者采用贝叶斯推理方法来推断系统的真实配置。通过使用差异隐私技术,提出的方法可以1)减少系统数量变化而导致网络安全的影响; 2)无论攻击者的推理能力如何,都可以抵抗攻击。实验结果证明了所提出的方法的有效性。
Cyber deception is one of the key approaches used to mislead attackers by hiding or providing inaccurate system information. There are two main factors limiting the real-world application of existing cyber deception approaches. The first limitation is that the number of systems in a network is assumed to be fixed. However, in the real world, the number of systems may be dynamically changed. The second limitation is that attackers' strategies are simplified in the literature. However, in the real world, attackers may be more powerful than theory suggests. To overcome these two limitations, we propose a novel differentially private game theoretic approach to cyber deception. In this proposed approach, a defender adopts differential privacy mechanisms to strategically change the number of systems and obfuscate the configurations of systems, while an attacker adopts a Bayesian inference approach to infer the real configurations of systems. By using the differential privacy technique, the proposed approach can 1) reduce the impacts on network security resulting from changes in the number of systems and 2) resist attacks regardless of attackers' reasoning power. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.