论文标题
受限人口游戏的原始偶对进化动力学
Primal-dual evolutionary dynamics for constrained population games
论文作者
论文摘要
人口游戏可以被视为研究玩家人群的战略互动的工具。尽管对此类领域有几个关注，但大多数可用的作品仅集中在无约束的情况下。也就是说，游戏的允许平衡不受限制。为了进一步扩展人口游戏的能力，在本文中，我们提出了一类新颖的原始偶发性进化动力学，可以考虑在游戏均衡时必须满足的约束。使用二元理论和Lyapunov稳定性理论，我们提供了足够的条件来确保在经过考虑的约束下，游戏平衡集的渐近稳定性和可行性。此外，我们通过增加约束来说明开发理论在某些古典人群游戏中的应用。
Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That is, the allowed equilibrium of the game is not constrained. To further extend the capabilities of population games, in this paper we propose a novel class of primal-dual evolutionary dynamics that allow the consideration of constraints that must be satisfied at the equilibrium of the game. Using duality theory and Lyapunov stability theory, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability and feasibility of the equilibria set of the game under the considered constraints. Furthermore, we illustrate the application of the developed theory to some classical population games with the addition of constraints.
