论文标题
Wigner朋友的持续现实的无关定理
A no-go theorem for the persistent reality of Wigner's friend's perception
论文作者
论文摘要
臭名昭著的Wigner的朋友思想实验(及其修改)近年来引起了人们的兴趣,尤其是由于新论点迫使我们质疑量子理论的一些基本假设。在本文中,我们为Wigner朋友的感知的持续现实制定了一个无关定理,这使我们得出结论,如果满足了看似自然的量子机械假设,那么朋友对自己的测量结果的看法就无法“共享相同的现实”。更正式的是,这意味着,在Wigner的朋友的情况下,在两个不同的时间内,没有联合概率分布,这在两个不同的时间内都没有线性地取决于测量系统的初始状态,并且其边际重现了单位量子理论的预测。该定理需要一个人必须(1)提出对两次预测的非线性修改,(2)有时禁止使用当前信息来预测未来 - 从而降低量子理论的预测能力 - 或(3)否认单位量子机制使所有量词都有有效的单时间预测。我们简要讨论定理的假设更有可能在各种流行的量子力学解释中删除。
The notorious Wigner's friend thought experiment (and modifications thereof) has in recent years received renewed interest especially due to new arguments that force us to question some of the fundamental assumptions of quantum theory. In this paper, we formulate a no-go theorem for the persistent reality of Wigner's friend's perception, which allows us to conclude that the perceptions that the friend has of her own measurement outcomes at different times cannot "share the same reality", if seemingly natural quantum mechanical assumptions are met. More formally, this means that, in a Wigner's friend scenario, there is no joint probability distribution for the friend's perceived measurement outcomes at two different times, that depends linearly on the initial state of the measured system and whose marginals reproduce the predictions of unitary quantum theory. This theorem entails that one must either (1) propose a nonlinear modification of the Born rule for two-time predictions, (2) sometimes prohibit the use of present information to predict the future -- thereby reducing the predictive power of quantum theory -- or (3) deny that unitary quantum mechanics makes valid single-time predictions for all observers. We briefly discuss which of the theorem's assumptions are more likely to be dropped within various popular interpretations of quantum mechanics.