论文标题
激励未来互联网体系结构中的稳定路径选择
Incentivizing Stable Path Selection in Future Internet Architectures
论文作者
论文摘要
通过将路径控制委托给最终主持人,未来的互联网体系结构为选择路径选择提供了灵活性。但是,人们担心如果在没有协调或准确的负载信息的情况下执行路径选择,则末端主机的分布式路由决策,特别是负载自适应路由。先前的研究通过设计导致稳定性的路径选择政策来解决这一问题。但是,对于这些政策在互联网上下文中的可行性知之甚少,如果这种偏差从个人的角度有益,那么自私的最终主持人可以偏离规定的政策。为了在未来的Internet体系结构中实现网络稳定性,最终主持人必须动力采用面向稳定性的路径选择策略。在这项工作中,我们对文献中提出的稳定性路径选择策略进行了首次激励分析。在最终宿主路径选择的游戏理论模型的基础上,我们表明这些政策实际上与最终主持人的自身利益不相容,因为这些策略使得追求振荡性路径选择策略是值得的。因此,必须通过激励兼容的机制来实现具有自私终点的网络的稳定性。我们提出了两种此类机制,并正式证明了它们的激励兼容性。
By delegating path control to end-hosts, future Internet architectures offer flexibility for path selection. However, there is a concern that the distributed routing decisions by end-hosts, in particular load-adaptive routing, can lead to oscillations if path selection is performed without coordination or accurate load information. Prior research has addressed this problem by devising path-selection policies that lead to stability. However, little is known about the viability of these policies in the Internet context, where selfish end-hosts can deviate from a prescribed policy if such a deviation is beneficial fromtheir individual perspective. In order to achieve network stability in future Internet architectures, it is essential that end-hosts have an incentive to adopt a stability-oriented path-selection policy. In this work, we perform the first incentive analysis of the stability-inducing path-selection policies proposed in the literature. Building on a game-theoretic model of end-host path selection, we show that these policies are in fact incompatible with the self-interest of end-hosts, as these strategies make it worthwhile to pursue an oscillatory path-selection strategy. Therefore, stability in networks with selfish end-hosts must be enforced by incentive-compatible mechanisms. We present two such mechanisms and formally prove their incentive compatibility.