论文标题
含糊的说服力：前公式
Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation
论文作者
论文摘要
考虑一个说服力游戏，其中发件人和接收者都对Maxmin预期实用程序（MEU）的偏好都是歧义性的，并且发件人可以选择模棱两可的信息结构。本文以前的公式分析了游戏：发件人首先提交信息结构，然后接收器通过选择前消息传递行动计划来最佳响应。在此公式下，我表明，对于发件人而言，使用模棱两可的信息结构与标准明确的信息结构绝不是有益的。这个结果对（i）具有异质信念的玩家和/或（ii）具有非MEU，不确定性的偏好的接收器。但是，它对具有非MEU首选项的发件人是\ emph {non}。
Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous information structure as opposed to a standard unambiguous one. This result is robust to (i) the players having heterogeneous beliefs over the states, and/or (ii) the receiver having non-MEU, uncertainty-averse preferences. However, it is \emph{not} robust to the sender having non-MEU preferences.
