论文标题
冒险行为和反协调游戏中的状态偏好的演变
Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games
论文作者
论文摘要
本文分析了当个人面临抗调节任务时，冒险行为和对消费等级的偏好如何成为中立稳定的平衡。如果在其他均质的社会中有关相对消费的信息，则不能忽略这一点。尽管目标函数凹入，但稳定的类型必须愿意接受风险的赌博来区分自己，从而允许协调。相对消费是一种昂贵的沟通形式。这表明在差异尤其昂贵的设置中，地位偏好是显着的。
This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about relative consumption becomes available, this cannot be ignored. Despite concavity in the objective function, stable types must be willing to accept risky gambles to differentiate themselves, and thus allow for coordination. Relative consumption acts as a form of costly communication. This suggests status preferences to be salient in settings where miscoordination is particularly costly.
