论文标题
基于代码的全日制签名的密码分析
Cryptanalysis of a code-based full-time signature
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了基于lyubashevsky协议的基于代码的签名方案的攻击，该方案最近由歌曲，黄，Mu，Wu和Wang（SHMWW）提出。 SHMWW方案中的私钥包含列，部分来自身份矩阵，部分来自随机矩阵。存在两种类型的列的存在导致在产生的特征中设定位的分布有很大的偏见。我们的攻击利用了这样的偏见，可以从一堆收集的签名中恢复私钥。我们提供了对攻击的理论分析以及实验评估，我们表明，只有10个签名足以收集到成功恢复私钥的情况下。至于以前的尝试将Lyubashevsky的协议调整为基于代码的密码学案例，因此，SHMWW方案被证明无法提供可接受的安全性。这证实，设计具有效率的安全基于代码的签名方案与其他量子后解决方案（例如，基于晶格）的效率相当仍然是一项具有挑战性的任务。
We present an attack against a code-based signature scheme based on the Lyubashevsky protocol that was recently proposed by Song, Huang, Mu, Wu and Wang (SHMWW). The private key in the SHMWW scheme contains columns coming in part from an identity matrix and in part from a random matrix. The existence of two types of columns leads to a strong bias in the distribution of set bits in produced signatures. Our attack exploits such a bias to recover the private key from a bunch of collected signatures. We provide a theoretical analysis of the attack along with experimental evaluations, and we show that as few as 10 signatures are enough to be collected for successfully recovering the private key. As for previous attempts of adapting Lyubashevsky's protocol to the case of code-based cryptography, the SHMWW scheme is thus proved unable to provide acceptable security. This confirms that devising secure code-based signature schemes with efficiency comparable to that of other post-quantum solutions (e.g., based on lattices) is still a challenging task.
