论文标题
DOS攻击对褪色渠道的最佳功率控制:游戏理论方法
Optimal Power Control for DoS Attack over Fading Channel: A Game-Theoretic Approach
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中,我们调查了针对易受伤害的无线网络的智能拒绝服务(DOS)攻击的远程估计,该网络的渠道经历了衰减和褪色引起的衰减。我们使用传感器观察系统状态并将其局部状态估算传输到远程中心。同时,攻击者注入了一个干扰信号,以破坏远程中心接受的数据包并导致性能退化。大多数现有作品都是建立在频率不变的频道状态信息(CSI)模型的基础上,该模型在该模型中逐渐褪色。但是,无线通信通道更容易发生动态变化。为了捕获现实世界网络的通道质量的这种时变属性,我们研究了褪色的渠道网络,其通道模型的特征是有限的有限状态马尔可夫链。有了两个无限时间的球员的目标,我们用一般和随机游戏描述了攻击者和传感器之间的冲突特征。此外,采用Q学习技术以在NASH平衡处获得最佳的策略对。最佳固定策略的单调结构也是在充分条件下构建的。此外,除了完整的渠道状态信息(CSI)以外,我们还研究了频道增长,我们还研究了使用贝叶斯游戏的部分CSI。根据玩家自己的频道信息以及对其他玩家的渠道分布的信念,获得了NASH平衡的能量策略。
In this paper, we investigate remote state estimation against an intelligent denial-of-service (DoS) attack over a vulnerable wireless network whose channel undergoes attenuation and distortion caused by fading. We use the sensor to observe system states and transmit its local state estimates to the remote center. Meanwhile, the attacker injects a jamming signal to destroy the packet accepted by the remote center and causes the performance degradation. Most of the existing works are built on a time-invariant channel state information (CSI) model in which the channel fading is stationary. However, the wireless communication channels are more prone to dynamic changes. To capture this time-variant property in the channel quality of the real-world networks, we study the fading channel network whose channel model is characterized by a generalized finite-state Markov chain. With the goals of two players in infinite-time horizon, we describe the conflicting characteristic between the attacker and the sensor with a general-sum stochastic game. Moreover, the Q-learning techniques are applied to obtain an optimal strategy pair at a Nash equilibrium. Also the monotone structure of the optimal stationary strategy is constructed under a sufficient condition. Besides, when channel gain is known a priori, except for the full Channel State Information (CSI), we also investigate the partial CSI, where Bayesian games are employed. Based on the player's own channel information and the belief on the channel distribution of other players, the energy strategy at a Nash equilibrium is obtained.