论文标题
优先级的分类显然是策略性的
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了稳定匹配机制的战略简单性，其中一侧具有固定的偏好，称为优先级。具体来说，我们问哪些优先级是如此，以至于无法执行应急推理的代理人可以识别递延接受的战略性（DA），即\ emph {什么时候da显然是tragist -profforn}（li，2017）？ 我们通过完全表征使DA明显策略性（OSP）的优先级来回答这个问题。这解决了Ashlagi和Gonczarowski，2018年的空旷问题。我们发现，当DA为OSP时，优先级是无环的（Ergin，2002），限制性条件允许优先级仅在两个代理上仅在两个代理上有所不同，或者包含一个非常有限的循环模式，而所有优先级列表完全相同，而所有优先级都是相同的。我们得出的结论是，对于稳定的匹配机制，可理解性（从OSP的意义上）和优先级表现力之间的张力非常高。
We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the strategyproofness of deferred acceptance (DA) can be recognized by agents unable to perform contingency reasoning, that is, \emph{when is DA obviously strategyproof} (Li, 2017)? We answer this question by completely characterizing those priorities which make DA obviously strategyproof (OSP). This solves an open problem of Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018. We find that when DA is OSP, priorities are either acyclic (Ergin, 2002), a restrictive condition which allows priorities to only differ on only two agents at a time, or contain an extremely limited cyclic pattern where all priority lists are identical except for exactly two. We conclude that, for stable matching mechanisms, the tension between understandability (in the sense of OSP) and expressiveness of priorities is very high.
