论文标题
Niels Bohr，客观性和测量的不可逆性
Niels Bohr, objectivity, and the irreversibility of measurements
论文作者
论文摘要
测量值不可逆的唯一可接受的原因是确定的结果是人类感觉体验的内在确定性和不可逆性。尽管QBIST值得赞扬他们对这一立场的辩护，但尼尔斯·鲍尔（Niels Bohr）敦促大约一个世纪前，尽管以椭圆形的方式，他的信息的核心已经丢失或扭曲了。然后，与现在一样，经验科学的客观性受到质疑。它是由康德（当时的）革命科学理论的路线捍卫的，经验科学的可能性取决于将经验思考的可能性作为互动，可重新识别对象体验的经验的可能性。鲍尔（Bohr）在康德（Kant）的理论中补充的是，他的见解是，经验知识不一定仅限于感官可以直接访问的内容，因此，它不必仅仅是对明智直觉对象的知识。它也可能是对现象的知识，而不是明智的直觉对象，而是由实验环境构成的，这是明智的直觉的对象。但是，玻尔的客观性基础（或与量子力学一致的客观性）比康德（或与牛顿物理学一致的客观性）弱。该结论是基于对Bohr在吸引不可逆的放大效果或测量设备的足够大小和重量的意图的研究。
The only acceptable reason why measurements are irreversible and outcomes definite is the intrinsic definiteness and irreversibility of human sensory experience. While QBists deserve credit for their spirited defense of this position, Niels Bohr urged it nearly a century ago, albeit in such elliptic ways that the core of his message has been lost or distorted beyond recognition. Then as now, the objectivity of empirical science was called into question. It was defended by Bohr along the lines of Kant's (then) revolutionary theory of science, according to which the possibility of empirical science hinges on the possibility of thinking of experiences as experiences of a system of interacting, re-identifiable objects. What Bohr added to Kant's theory was his insight that empirical knowledge was not necessarily limited to what is directly accessible to the senses, and that, therefore, it does not have to be solely a knowledge of objects of sensible intuition. It can also be a knowledge of phenomena that are not objects of sensible intuition but instead are constituted by experimental contexts, which are objects of sensible intuition. Bohr's grounding of objectivity (or the objectivity consistent with quantum mechanics), however, is weaker than Kant's (or the objectivity consistent with Newtonian physics). This conclusion is based on an examination of Bohr's intentions in appealing to irreversible amplification effects or the sufficient size and weight of the measurement apparatus.
