论文标题
对基于硬件的安全性原始攻击
Attacks on Lightweight Hardware-Based Security Primitives
论文作者
论文摘要
在当今的数字时代，数据收集，传输和存储的便利性继续塑造现代社会以及我们与世界互动的方式。优势很多，但是无意间陷入错误的信息的风险也增加了。在硬件层面上找到保护敏感信息的方法至关重要，在本文中，我们旨在对旨在做到这一点的基于轻量硬件的安全性基准（LHSP）的最新攻击进行调查。具体而言，我们对这些提出的LHSP的攻击弹性进行了分析，以试图使人们意识到可能存在的任何漏洞。我们这样做是为了希望它能鼓励攻击对策的持续发展以及全新的数据保护方法，以防止讨论的攻击方法将来保持可行。讨论的LHSP的类型包括物理不荡情的功能（PUF）和真实的随机数发生器（TRNG），主要重点放在PUF上。
In today's digital age, the ease of data collection, transfer, and storage continue to shape modern society and the ways we interact with our world. The advantages are numerous, but there is also an increased risk of information unintentionally falling into the wrong hands. Finding methods of protecting sensitive information at the hardware level is of utmost importance, and in this paper, we aim to provide a survey on recent developments in attacks on lightweight hardware-based security primitives (LHSPs) designed to do just that. Specifically, we provide an analysis of the attack resilience of these proposed LHSPs in an attempt to bring awareness to any vulnerabilities that may exist. We do this in the hope that it will encourage the continued development of attack countermeasures as well as completely new methods of data protection in order to prevent the discussed methods of attack from remaining viable in the future. The types of LHSPs discussed include physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and true random number generators (TRNGs), with a primary emphasis placed on PUFs.
