论文标题
挑选对象机制
Pick-an-object Mechanisms
论文作者
论文摘要
我们引入了一个新的机制，用于单方面的匹配市场，该机制表示为Pick-An-Object（PAO）机制。当通过PAO实施分配规则时，要求代理从个性化菜单中挑选一个对象。这些选择以后可能会被拒绝，并且这些代理商会出现新菜单。当过程结束时，将代理分配了他们选择的最后一个对象。我们表征了可以通过PAO机制顺序对的分配规则，以及可以在稳健的真实平衡中实现的规则。我们通过表明其平衡行为与明显的策略（OSP）机制密切相关，但实现了常用的规则，例如Gale-Shapley DA和顶级交易周期，它们的平衡行为与这种平衡行为密切相关，这证明了PAO的使用而不是直接机制是合理的。我们运行实验室实验，以比较使用PAO，OSP和直接机制实施不同规则的真实行为。这些表明，与直接同行相比，代理人更有可能与PAO和OSP实施下的理论预测相符。
We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may be rejected later on, and these agents are presented with new menus. When the procedure ends, agents are assigned the last object they picked. We characterize the allocation rules that can be sequentialized by PAO mechanisms, as well as the ones that can be implemented in a robust truthful equilibrium. We justify the use of PAO as opposed to direct mechanisms by showing that its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the one in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms, but implements commonly used rules, such as Gale-Shapley DA and top trading cycles, which are not OSP-implementable. We run laboratory experiments comparing truthful behavior when using PAO, OSP, and direct mechanisms to implement different rules. These indicate that agents are more likely to behave in line with the theoretical prediction under PAO and OSP implementations than their direct counterparts.
