论文标题
不完美的信誉与没有最佳货币政策的信誉
Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy
论文作者
论文摘要
最小的中央银行的信誉，其概率是不续签承诺的可能性（“准承诺”），这是锚定通货膨胀预期和稳定通货膨胀动态的必要条件。相比之下，完全缺乏信誉，并确定决策者会避免承诺（“最佳酌处权”），这会导致当地的通货膨胀动态不稳定。在New-Keyneian Phillips曲线的教科书示例中，政策工具对准承诺中最佳政策的通货膨胀差距的响应与最佳酌处权相反，这解释了这一分叉。
A minimal central bank credibility, with a non-zero probability of not renegning his commitment ("quasi-commitment"), is a necessary condition for anchoring inflation expectations and stabilizing inflation dynamics. By contrast, a complete lack of credibility, with the certainty that the policy maker will renege his commitment ("optimal discretion"), leads to the local instability of inflation dynamics. In the textbook example of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, the response of the policy instrument to inflation gaps for optimal policy under quasi-commitment has an opposite sign than in optimal discretion, which explains this bifurcation.
