论文标题
确定性随机数生成器攻击针对Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise安全钥匙交换协议
Deterministic Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
论文作者
论文摘要
本文证明了Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise（KLJN）安全钥匙交换器的脆弱性，即使这些随机数仅用于产生噪声，从而损害了随机数发生器，即使这些随机数仅用于模仿Alice's和Bob的电阻器的Johnson Noise。所显示的攻击是确定性的，因为夏娃对爱丽丝和/或鲍勃的随机数的了解基本上是确定性的。此外，除了很少发生可忽略不计的，随机的等待时间和验证时间的事件外，不需要统计评估。我们探索两种情况。在第一种情况下，夏娃都知道爱丽丝和鲍勃的随机声音。我们表明，在这种情况下，夏娃可以通过使用欧姆定律迅速破解安全的密钥。在另一种情况下，夏娃只知道鲍勃的随机噪音。然后，夏娃首先可以通过使用欧姆定律来学习鲍勃的阻力价值。因此，她将拥有与鲍勃相同的知识，因此在位交换期结束时，她会知道爱丽丝的一点。
This paper demonstrates the vulnerability of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger to compromised random number generator(s) even if these random numbers are used solely to generate the noises emulating the Johnson noise of Alice's and Bob's resistors. The attacks shown are deterministic in the sense that Eve's knowledge of Alice's and/or Bob's random numbers is basically deterministic. Moreover, no statistical evaluation is needed, except for rarely occurring events of negligible, random waiting time and verification time. We explore two situations. In the first case, Eve knows both Alice's and Bob's random noises. We show that, in this situation, Eve can quickly crack the secure key bit by using Ohm's Law. In the other situation, Eve knows only Bob's random noise. Then Eve first can learn Bob's resistance value by using Ohm's Law. Therefore, she will have the same knowledge as Bob, thus at the end of the bit exchange period, she will know Alice's bit.
