论文标题
同等容量的多市场寡头
Multi-market Oligopoly of Equal Capacity
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了库诺特竞争的一种变体，其中多家公司在多个市场上分配了相同数量的资源。我们证明了该游戏具有独特的纯构成NASH平衡（NE），它是对称的，其特征是“潜在函数”的最大点。在梯度调整过程中，NE在全球渐近稳定，通常在社会上并不是最佳的。应用程序正在运输中，驾驶员在街道网络上分配时间。
We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is characterized by the maximal point of a "potential function". The NE is globally asymptotically stable under the gradient adjustment process, and is not socially optimal in general. An application is in transportation, where drivers allocate time over a street network.
