论文标题
量子黑客使用暂时幽灵成像感知量子密钥分布
Quantum hacking perceiving for quantum key distribution using temporal ghost imaging
论文作者
论文摘要
量子密钥分布（QKD）可以通过量子力学之间生成远程用户之间的安全键位。但是，理论模型与实际实现之间的差距为窃听者提供了拦截秘密密钥的机会。最阴险的攻击是量子黑客攻击，是使用QKD系统的侧道漏洞的测量结果没有明显差异的攻击。描绘量子信号，量子渠道和QKD系统的全日制特征可以为合法用户提供额外的功能来击败恶意攻击。我们第一次提出了探索时间幽灵成像（TGI）方案的方法，以感知使用时间指纹识别量子黑客入侵，并通过实验验证其有效性。该计划提出了一种从新的信号和系统的角度来促进QKD的实际安全性的常见方法。
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can generate secure key bits between remote users with quantum mechanics. However, the gap between the theoretical model and practical realizations gives eavesdroppers opportunities to intercept secret key. The most insidious attacks, known as quantum hacking, are the ones with no significant discrepancy of the measurement results using side-channel loopholes of QKD systems. Depicting full-time-scale characteristics of the quantum signals, the quantum channel, and the QKD system can provide legitimate users extra capabilities to defeat malicious attacks. For the first time, we propose the method exploring temporal ghost imaging (TGI) scheme to perceive quantum hacking with temporal fingerprints and experimentally verify its validity. The scheme presents a common approach to promote QKD's practical security from a new perspective of signals and systems.
