论文标题
IRO:完整性和可靠性增强了环ORAM
IRO: Integrity and Reliability Enhanced Ring ORAM
论文作者
论文摘要
内存安全性和可靠性是云计算系统中的两个主要设计问题。最先进的内存安全性可负责共同设计(例如协同效应)在绩效,机密性,完整性和可靠性方面取得了良好的平衡。但是,这些作品仅依靠加密来确保数据机密性,事实证明,这无法防止内存访问模式中的信息泄漏。 RING ORAM是一种有吸引力的机密保护协议,可将内存访问模式隐藏到未经信任的存储系统中。不幸的是,它与安全可靠性共同设计不兼容。强制组合将导致更严重的性能损失。 在本文中,我们提出了IRO,一种完整性和可靠性增强的环环俄罗拉邦设计。为了减少完整性验证的开销,我们提出了一个低开销的完整性树RIT,并使用最小更新子树(必须)来减少元数据更新开销。为了提高内存可靠性,我们提出了安全的复制,以为Oram树提供渠道级别的错误弹性,并使用镜像通道技术来保证必要的可靠性。最后,我们使用误差校正指针(ECP)来修复永久性存储单元故障,以进一步提高设备的可靠性和寿命。紧凑的元数据设计用于减少ECP的存储和咨询开销。 IRO提供了强大的安全性和可靠性保证,而所得的存储和性能开销非常小。我们的评估表明,在两个频道下,IRO平均仅增加7.54%的执行时间,而在两个频道下进行了四个AES-GCM单元设置。通过足够的AES-GCM单元执行并发MAC计算,IRO可以减少基线的2.14%执行时间。
Memory security and reliability are two of the major design concerns in cloud computing systems. State-of-the-art memory security-reliability co-designs (e.g. Synergy) have achieved a good balance on performance, confidentiality, integrity, and reliability. However, these works merely rely on encryption to ensure data confidentiality, which has been proven unable to prevent information leakage from memory access patterns. Ring ORAM is an attractive confidential protection protocol to hide memory access patterns to the untrusted storage system. Unfortunately, it does not compatible with the security-reliability co-designs. A forced combination would result in more severe performance loss. In this paper, we propose IRO, an Integrity and Reliability enhanced Ring ORAM design. To reduce the overhead of integrity verification, we propose a low overhead integrity tree RIT and use a Minimum Update Subtree Tree (MUST) to reduce metadata update overhead. To improve memory reliability, we present Secure Replication to provide channel-level error resilience for the ORAM tree and use the mirrored channel technique to guarantee the reliability of the MUST. Last, we use the error correction pointer (ECP) to repair permanent memory cell fault to further improve device reliability and lifetime. A compact metadata design is used to reduce the storage and consulting overhead of the ECP. IRO provides strong security and reliability guarantees, while the resulting storage and performance overhead is very small. Our evaluation shows that IRO only increases 7.54% execution time on average over the Baseline under two channels four AES-GCM units setting. With enough AES-GCM units to perform concurrent MAC computing, IRO can reduce 2.14% execution time of the Baseline.