论文标题
在零和两个人的两个人完美信息中
On Zero-Sum Two Person Perfect Information Semi-Markov Games
论文作者
论文摘要
在限制比率的平均值下，零和两人的完美信息半马尔可夫游戏（PISMG）具有价值，最大化器和最小者都具有最佳的纯纯半平稳策略。我们通过首先修复任意初始状态并形成与两个参与者的每对纯平稳策略相对应的未估计的回报的矩阵，并证明该矩阵具有纯鞍点。
A zero-sum two-person Perfect Information Semi-Markov game (PISMG) under limiting ratio average payoff has a value and both the maximiser and the minimiser have optimal pure semi-stationary strategies. We arrive at the result by first fixing an arbitrary initial state and forming the matrix of undiscounted payoffs corresponding to each pair of pure stationary strategies of the two players and proving that this matrix has a pure saddle point.
