论文标题
考虑到社会和个人利益
Decision Making for Connected Automated Vehicles at Urban Intersections Considering Social and Individual Benefits
论文作者
论文摘要
为了解决城市场景中连接的自动车辆(CAV)的协调问题,提出了一个游戏理论决策框架,该框架可以提高社会利益,包括交通系统效率和安全性以及个人用户的好处。根据拟议的决策框架,在这项工作中,研究了代表性的城市驾驶场景,即未信号的十字路口。一旦车辆进入聚焦区,它将与其他骑士进行互动并做出协作决策。为了评估周围车辆的安全风险并降低决策算法的复杂性,驾驶风险评估算法的设计采用高斯潜在的现场方法设计。决策成本功能是通过考虑骑士的驾驶安全性和通过效率来构建的。此外,设计了决策限制,包括安全性,舒适性,效率,控制和稳定性。根据成本函数和约束,模糊的联盟游戏方法应用于未信号交叉点的CAVS决策问题。建立了两种类型的模糊联盟,这些联盟反映了个人和社会利益。两种类型的模糊联盟中的福利分配与骑士的攻击性有关。最后,通过三个测试用例验证了拟议决策框架的有效性和可行性。
To address the coordination issue of connected automated vehicles (CAVs) at urban scenarios, a game-theoretic decision-making framework is proposed that can advance social benefits, including the traffic system efficiency and safety, as well as the benefits of individual users. Under the proposed decision-making framework, in this work, a representative urban driving scenario, i.e. the unsignalized intersection, is investigated. Once the vehicle enters the focused zone, it will interact with other CAVs and make collaborative decisions. To evaluate the safety risk of surrounding vehicles and reduce the complexity of the decision-making algorithm, the driving risk assessment algorithm is designed with a Gaussian potential field approach. The decision-making cost function is constructed by considering the driving safety and passing efficiency of CAVs. Additionally, decision-making constraints are designed and include safety, comfort, efficiency, control and stability. Based on the cost function and constraints, the fuzzy coalitional game approach is applied to the decision-making issue of CAVs at unsignalized intersections. Two types of fuzzy coalitions are constructed that reflect both individual and social benefits. The benefit allocation in the two types of fuzzy coalitions is associated with the driving aggressiveness of CAVs. Finally, the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed decision-making framework are verified with three test cases.