论文标题
声誉谈判和效率低下的技术采用
Reputational Bargaining and Inefficient Technology Adoption
论文作者
论文摘要
买方和卖方都要讨价还价。两位球员都可以通过随着时间的推移提供相同的价格来建立声誉。在玩家讨价还价之前，卖方决定是否采用一种新技术可以降低其生产成本。我们表明，即使买方无法观察卖方的收养决定，玩家的声誉激励措施也会导致不足的不足和达成协议的重大延误，并且只有在收养的社会利益足够大的情况下，这些效率低下就会达到平衡。我们的结果表明，收养的收益增加可能会降低采用的可能性，而卖方采用节省成本的技术的机会可能会降低社会福利。
A buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object. Both players can build reputations for being obstinate by offering the same price over time. Before players bargain, the seller decides whether to adopt a new technology that can lower his cost of production. We show that even when the buyer cannot observe the seller's adoption decision, players' reputational incentives can lead to inefficient under-adoption and significant delays in reaching agreement, and that these inefficiencies arise in equilibrium if and only if the social benefit from adoption is large enough. Our result implies that an increase in the benefit from adoption may lower the probability of adoption and that the seller's opportunity to adopt a cost-saving technology may lower social welfare.
