论文标题
关于灰色智力系统和广义共同信息的游戏理论分析
A Game Theoretical Analysis on the Gray-Wyner System and Generalised Common Information
论文作者
论文摘要
我们分析了广义灰色智力问题的常见信息问题。我们旨在探讨与源解码器组件之间非正交性有关的问题和解决方案。我们考虑一个由2组用户组成的简单网络控制系统:(i)一个名为Alice的发件人或观察者; (ii)一组名为Bobs的多个接收器或控制器。为了应对鲍勃之间的共同信息产生的可能风险,爱丽丝提供了冗余,创建了一些虚拟消息,这些消息在每个特定的鲍勃的零中,但没有针对其他鲍勃。上述可能的风险是不可避免的,因为不可思议的是,其中一些/所有人可能会立即充当潜在的窃听者,并滥用上述共同信息。从理论上讲,这一尚未对我们所知的小说学科尚未对我们的了解。专门提出了新的数学问题,其中包括一些证明信息理论弛豫和非平稳性以及纳什·埃库利姆的存在。最后,模拟批准了我们的计划。
We analyse the common information problem for the generalised Gray-Wyner problem. We aim to explore the problem and solution in relation to the non-orthogonality among the source decoders' components. We consider a simple networked control system consisting of 2 groups of users: (i) one sender or Observer named Alice; and (ii) a group of multiple receivers or Controllers, named Bobs. In order to tackle the possible risk arisen from the common information among Bobs, Alice provides a redundancy creating some virtual messages which are in the null of each specific Bob, but not for others. The aforementioned possible risk is inevitable since, non-impossibly speaking, some/all of them may instantaneously act as potential Eavesdropper(s) with the abuse of the aforementioned common information. This novel discipline, which has not been investigated yet to the best of our knowledge, is theoretically interpreted from a mirror-game-theoretical point-of-view. Novel mathematical problems are derived specifically including some proofs for the information-theoretic relaxations and non-stationarity as well as the existence of the Nash equiblirium. Finally speaking, simulations approve our scheme.