论文标题
贝叶斯承诺的说服力：动态的前瞻性多基金会代表团，信息燃烧
Bayesian Promised Persuasion: Dynamic Forward-Looking Multiagent Delegation with Informational Burning
论文作者
论文摘要
这项工作研究了一个动态机制设计问题，其中主管将决策制定委派给了一组私人信息，而没有货币转移或燃烧。我们认为，校长私下拥有有关国家过渡的完整知识，并研究了她如何利用自己的私人观察来支持通过信息燃烧来支持代表团的激励兼容性，这一过程我们称为前瞻性的说服力。代表机制是制定的，在该机制中，由于说服力而形成信念等级制度，并发挥了动态的贝叶斯游戏。我们提出了一种新型的随机机制，称为贝叶斯承诺的代表团（BPD），其中的周期性激励兼容性通过说服和未来代表团的承诺来保证。我们表明，BPD可以实现与固定马尔可夫完美贝叶斯平衡中的原始机制相同的最佳社会福利。建立了一个启示录的基本设计制度，以表明具有信念层次结构的说服力可以充分表征，这是将代理人的本地BPD机制的随机化与说服力的随机化，作为对未来承诺的直接建议。
This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses complete knowledge about the state transitions and study how she can use her private observation to support the incentive compatibility of the delegation via informational burning, a process we refer to as the looking-forward persuasion. The delegation mechanism is formulated in which the agents form belief hierarchies due to the persuasion and play a dynamic Bayesian game. We propose a novel randomized mechanism, known as Bayesian promised delegation (BPD), in which the periodic incentive compatibility is guaranteed by persuasions and promises of future delegations. We show that the BPD can achieve the same optimal social welfare as the original mechanism in stationary Markov perfect Bayesian equilibria. A revelation-principle-like design regime is established to show that the persuasion with belief hierarchies can be fully characterized by correlating the randomization of the agents' local BPD mechanisms with the persuasion as a direct recommendation of the future promises.
