论文标题
顺序否决讨价还价，并提供不完整的信息
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究提议者和否决者之间的顺序讨价还价。两者都有单峰的偏好，但是提议者不确定否决权球员的理想点。提议者不能致力于未来的建议。当玩家耐心等时，可能会有Coasian动力学的平衡：否决权玩家的私人信息在很大程度上可以使提议者的议价能力无效。但是，我们的主要结果是，在某些条件下，提议者也获得了他将通过承诺权力获得的高收益。驱动力是，否决权播放器的单峰偏好为提议者提供了“跨越”的选项，即，以较早的情况下仅从低舒张类型中获得一致性，以从稍后从高级类型中获得可靠的盈余。从方法上讲，我们利用了顺序讨价还价与静态机理设计之间的联系。
We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single-peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The proposer cannot commit to future proposals. When players are patient, there can be equilibria with Coasian dynamics: the veto player's private information can largely nullify proposer's bargaining power. Our main result, however, is that under some conditions there are also equilibria in which the proposer obtains the high payoff that he would with commitment power. The driving force is that the veto player's single-peaked preferences give the proposer an option to "leapfrog", i.e., to secure agreement from only low-surplus types early on to credibly extract surplus from high types later. Methodologically, we exploit the connection between sequential bargaining and static mechanism design.
