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In the long term, reinforcement learning (RL) is considered by many AI theorists to be the most promising path to artificial general intelligence. This places RL practitioners in a position to design systems that have never existed before and lack prior documentation in law and policy. Public agencies could intervene on complex dynamics that were previously too opaque to deliberate about, and long-held policy ambitions would finally be made tractable. In this whitepaper we illustrate this potential and how it might be technically enacted in the domains of energy infrastructure, social media recommender systems, and transportation. Alongside these unprecedented interventions come new forms of risk that exacerbate the harms already generated by standard machine learning tools. We correspondingly present a new typology of risks arising from RL design choices, falling under four categories: scoping the horizon, defining rewards, pruning information, and training multiple agents. Rather than allowing RL systems to unilaterally reshape human domains, policymakers need new mechanisms for the rule of reason, foreseeability, and interoperability that match the risks these systems pose. We argue that criteria for these choices may be drawn from emerging subfields within antitrust, tort, and administrative law. It will then be possible for courts, federal and state agencies, and non-governmental organizations to play more active roles in RL specification and evaluation. Building on the "model cards" and "datasheets" frameworks proposed by Mitchell et al. and Gebru et al., we argue the need for Reward Reports for AI systems. Reward Reports are living documents for proposed RL deployments that demarcate design choices.