论文标题
改进了针对特洛伊木马攻击的量子密钥分布的有限键安全分析
Improved Finite-Key Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Against Trojan-Horse Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
量子密钥分布（QKD）的大多数安全证明无视从用户设备中泄漏信息的影响，因此不能防止Trojan-Horse攻击（THAS）。在THA中，窃听器将强烈的光注射到QKD设备中，然后分析反向反射的光，以了解有关其内部设置选择的信息。最近只有几篇著作考虑了这种安全威胁，但是除非设备与频道强烈隔离，否则预测QKD的性能相当差。在这里，我们在存在THA的情况下为基于诱饵状态的QKD方案得出有限的键安全界限，该方案的表现明显优于先前的分析。我们的结果构成了缩小QKD中理论与实践之间现有差距的重要一步。
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users' devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into the QKD apparatuses, and then analyzes the back-reflected light to learn information about their internal setting choices. Only a few recent works consider this security threat, but predict a rather poor performance of QKD unless the devices are strongly isolated from the channel. Here, we derive finite-key security bounds for decoy-state-based QKD schemes in the presence of THAs, which significantly outperform previous analyses. Our results constitute an important step forward to closing the existing gap between theory and practice in QKD.
