论文标题
丢失消息时区块链安全
Blockchain Security when Messages are Lost
论文作者
论文摘要
区块链研究中共识方案的安全分析主要集中在同步模型上，其中点对点通信延迟延迟在已知有限常数的上限上界定。这些模型在嘈杂的环境中是不现实的，其中可能会丢失消息（即产生无限延迟）。在这项工作中，我们研究了消息损失对工作证明最长链协议安全性的影响。我们引入了一个新的通信模型，以捕获称为$ 0- \ infty $模型的消息丢失的影响，并得出一个可耐受的对抗力量的区域，在该区域中，共识协议是安全的。担保是作为简单限制的，因为事务违反了所需的安全属性。具体来说，我们表明这种违规概率在安全参数中几乎呈指数衰减。我们的方法涉及构造块状树木的组合对象，并识别与它们相关的随机变量，这些变量可与分析相关。这种方法改善了现有的界限，并扩展了可能会丢失消息的设置中可耐受的对抗阈值的已知制度。
Security analyses for consensus protocols in blockchain research have primarily focused on the synchronous model, where point-to-point communication delays are upper bounded by a known finite constant. These models are unrealistic in noisy settings, where messages may be lost (i.e. incur infinite delay). In this work, we study the impact of message losses on the security of the proof-of-work longest-chain protocol. We introduce a new communication model to capture the impact of message loss called the $0-\infty$ model, and derive a region of tolerable adversarial power under which the consensus protocol is secure. The guarantees are derived as a simple bound for the probability that a transaction violates desired security properties. Specifically, we show that this violation probability decays almost exponentially in the security parameter. Our approach involves constructing combinatorial objects from blocktrees, and identifying random variables associated with them that are amenable to analysis. This approach improves existing bounds and extends the known regime for tolerable adversarial threshold in settings where messages may be lost.
