论文标题
可持续区块链的动态交易存储策略
Dynamic Transaction Storage Strategies for a Sustainable Blockchain
论文作者
论文摘要
作为比特币背后的核心技术,区块链的分散,防篡改和可追溯的功能使其成为组织创新的首选平台。在当前的比特币中,每四年减少一次票房奖励,预计交易费将成为2140年左右的矿工收入中的大多数。当交易费用主导采矿奖励时,诸如自私的采矿,底漆,降低和挖掘差距的战略偏差可能威胁到块链的完整性和安全性。本文提出了一组动态交易存储(DTS)策略,以维持在交易费用制度下的可持续区块链。我们证明,通过采用DTS策略并避免战略偏差,可以通过系统的模拟来降低激励动力的波动性。借助DTS,当采矿奖励仅基于交易费用时,诸如比特币之类的公共区块链将变得可持续。
As the core technology behind Bitcoin, Blockchain's decentralized, tamper-proof, and traceable features make it the preferred platform for organizational innovation. In current Bitcoin, block reward is halved every four years, and transaction fees are expected to become the majority of miner revenues around 2140. When transaction fee dominates mining rewards, strategic deviations such as Selfish Mining, Undercutting, and Mining Gap could threaten the integrity and security of the Blockchain. This paper proposes a set of Dynamic Transaction Storage (DTS) strategies for maintaining a sustainable Blockchain under the transaction-fee regime. We demonstrate that block incentive volatility can be reduced through systematic simulation by applying DTS strategies and avoiding strategic deviations. With DTS, public Blockchains such as Bitcoin become sustainable when the mining reward is solely based on the transaction fee.