论文标题
操纵艺术：安全游戏中多步操纵攻击的威胁
The Art of Manipulation: Threat of Multi-Step Manipulative Attacks in Security Games
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了Stackelberg安全游戏中多步操纵攻击的问题，其中一名聪明的攻击者试图在多个时间步骤中协调其攻击，以误导辩护人对攻击者行为的学习。这种攻击操纵最终将辩护人的巡逻策略影响到攻击者的利益。沿这一研究的先前工作只着眼于一击游戏，其中防守者学习攻击者的行为，然后设计一次相应的策略。另一方面，我们的工作调查了攻击者操纵的长期影响，在这种情况下，当前的攻击和防御选择决定了后卫的未来学习和巡逻计划。本文有三个关键的贡献。首先，我们引入了一种新的多步操作攻击游戏模型，该模型捕获了攻击者在整个时间范围内进行的顺序操纵攻击的影响。其次，我们提出了一种新算法，以计算攻击者的最佳操纵攻击计划，该计划应对多个时间步骤计算中涉及的多个连接优化组件的挑战。最后，我们对这种误导性攻击的影响提出了广泛的实验结果，这对攻击者有很大的好处，并为防守者带来了损失。
This paper studies the problem of multi-step manipulative attacks in Stackelberg security games, in which a clever attacker attempts to orchestrate its attacks over multiple time steps to mislead the defender's learning of the attacker's behavior. This attack manipulation eventually influences the defender's patrol strategy towards the attacker's benefit. Previous work along this line of research only focuses on one-shot games in which the defender learns the attacker's behavior and then designs a corresponding strategy only once. Our work, on the other hand, investigates the long-term impact of the attacker's manipulation in which current attack and defense choices of players determine the future learning and patrol planning of the defender. This paper has three key contributions. First, we introduce a new multi-step manipulative attack game model that captures the impact of sequential manipulative attacks carried out by the attacker over the entire time horizon. Second, we propose a new algorithm to compute an optimal manipulative attack plan for the attacker, which tackles the challenge of multiple connected optimization components involved in the computation across multiple time steps. Finally, we present extensive experimental results on the impact of such misleading attacks, showing a significant benefit for the attacker and loss for the defender.
