论文标题
贝叶斯说服与调解人
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
论文作者
论文摘要
知情的发件人通过一系列不知情的调解人与不知情的接收器进行通信；代理商的实用程序取决于接收者的行动和状态。对于任何数量的调解人，发件人的最佳值是特征的。对于一个调解人，表征具有限制发件人效用的限制的几何含义，最佳说服力需要与没有调解人相同数量的信号，并且调解器的存在对发件人永远不会盈利。令人惊讶的是，第二个调解人可能会提高价值，但最佳说服力可能需要更多信号。
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized. For one mediator, the characterization has a geometric meaning of constrained concavification of sender's utility, optimal persuasion requires the same number of signals as without mediators, and the presence of the mediator is never profitable for the sender. Surprisingly, the second mediator may improve the value but optimal persuasion may require more signals.
