论文标题
ATAMEGA328微控制器上AES键提取的基于电源的侧通道攻击
Power-Based Side-Channel Attack for AES Key Extraction on the ATMega328 Microcontroller
论文作者
论文摘要
我们演示了ATAMEGA328微控制器上闪存（流行的Arduino funino/uno板上使用的微控制器）上提取AES秘密键。我们将标准的AVR架构AES-128实现加载到芯片上，并使用几个不同的键加密随机选择的明文。我们在加密过程中测量了芯片的功耗，与所有可能的键相关的观察到的功耗与明文的预期功耗相关，并最终提取了AES期间使用的128位密钥。我们在这里描述了我们用于自动化功率跟踪收集的测试基础架构，概述了我们的相关性攻击，对数据收集和分析过程中遇到的痕迹的消毒以及绊脚石以及攻击的结果。
We demonstrate the extraction of an AES secret key from flash memory on the ATMega328 microcontroller (the microcontroller used on the popular Arduino Genuino/Uno board). We loaded a standard AVR-architecture AES-128 implementation onto the chip and encrypted randomly chosen plaintexts with several different keys. We measured the chip's power consumption during encryption, correlated observed power consumption with the expected power consumption of the plaintexts with every possible key, and ultimately extracted the 128-bit key used during AES. We describe here our test infrastructure for automated power trace collection, an overview of our correlation attack, sanitization of the traces and stumbling blocks encountered during data collection and analysis, and results of our attack.
