论文标题
有同弹性需求和规模不经济
Cournot duopoly games with isoelastic demands and diseconomies of scale
论文作者
论文摘要
在此讨论草案中，我们研究了五种不同的双重垄断游戏模型，其中假定市场具有同弹性需求功能。此外，考虑了反映规模降低回报的二次成本功能。该草稿中的游戏由两个非线性差方程的系统制定。通过符号计算分析了现有的均衡及其局部稳定性。在逐渐调整玩家和合理（或有限理性的）玩家互相竞争的模型中，规模的不经济被证明具有稳定性增强的效果，这与Fisher在线性需求功能具有同质性寡头的相似结果一致。
In this discussion draft, we investigate five different models of duopoly games, where the market is assumed to have an isoelastic demand function. Moreover, quadratic cost functions reflecting decreasing returns to scale are considered. The games in this draft are formulated with systems of two nonlinear difference equations. Existing equilibria and their local stability are analyzed by symbolic computations. In the model where a gradiently adjusting player and a rational (or a boundedly rational) player compete with each other, diseconomies of scale are proved to have an effect of stability enhancement, which is consistent with the similar results found by Fisher for homogeneous oligopolies with linear demand functions.
