论文标题
关于社会身份在市场中的作用（MIS）信息
On The Role of Social Identity in the Market for (Mis)information
论文作者
论文摘要
在传播和心理学文献中的最新作品中，我们在人类信息消费中扮演社会身份（一个人属于群体的感觉）的作用。社会认同理论（SIT）的标志是“地位”的概念，即，个人渴望增强其及其“小组内的“实用性相对于“群体”的效用）。在信仰形成的背景下，这是一种渴望相信有关群体内部和负面新闻的积极新闻的愿望，该新闻在经验上已被证明以支持对错误信息和虚假新闻的信念。 我们将这种现象模拟为在新闻来源（发送者）和新闻消费者（接收器）之间在信息渠道上玩的stackelberg游戏，但除了准确性外，接收者将与社会身份相关的“状态”结合在一起。我们表征了发件人必须采用的策略，以确保其信息受到所有身份的接收者的信任，同时最大程度地提高其整体信息质量。我们表明，通常，当接收者的身份意识增加时，这种平衡的最佳信息质量会降低。我们进一步证明了如何使用模型的扩展来定量估计人口中对身份的重要性水平。
Motivated by recent works in the communication and psychology literature, we model and study the role social identity -- a person's sense of belonging to a group -- plays in human information consumption. A hallmark of Social Identity Theory (SIT) is the notion of 'status', i.e., an individual's desire to enhance their and their 'in-group's' utility relative to that of an 'out-group'. In the context of belief formation, this comes off as a desire to believe positive news about the in-group and negative news about the out-group, which has been empirically shown to support belief in misinformation and false news. We model this phenomenon as a Stackelberg game being played over an information channel between a news-source (sender) and news-consumer (receiver), with the receiver incorporating the 'status' associated with social identity in their utility, in addition to accuracy. We characterize the strategy that must be employed by the sender to ensure that its message is trusted by receivers of all identities while maximizing their overall quality of information. We show that, as a rule, this optimal quality of information at equilibrium decreases when a receiver's sense of identity increases. We further demonstrate how extensions of our model can be used to quantitatively estimate the level of importance given to identity in a population.
