论文标题
内源信息提供的透明度和决策
Transparency and Policymaking with Endogenous Information Provision
论文作者
论文摘要
当偏见的游说者内源性提供信息时，政治家的声誉如何影响信息提供？我开发了一个模型来研究这个问题，并表明答案取决于透明度设计。当游说者的偏好是公开的，政治家的声誉关注会导致游说者提供更多信息。当游说者的偏好尚不清楚时，政治家的声誉问题可能会导致游说者提供更少的信息。结果的一个含义是，给定透明的偏好，决策后果的透明度可以通过主持政治家的声誉激励来阻碍信息提供。
How does the politician's reputation concern affect information provision when the information is endogenously provided by a biased lobbyist? I develop a model to study this problem and show that the answer depends on the transparency design. When the lobbyist's preference is publicly known, the politician's reputation concern induces the lobbyist to provide more information. When the lobbyist's preference is unknown, the politician's reputation concern may induce the lobbyist to provide less information. One implication of the result is that given transparent preferences, the transparency of decision consequences can impede information provision by moderating the politician's reputational incentive.
