论文标题
通过Stackelberg游戏方法安全地在具有波动安全状况的领域提供关键服务
Safe Delivery of Critical Services in Areas with Volatile Security Situation via a Stackelberg Game Approach
论文作者
论文摘要
在资源不足的情况下，具有安全风险的疫苗输送不仅具有挑战性，而且威胁生命。当前的共同大流行和接种疫苗的需求增加了这一问题的紧迫性。在此问题的促进的情况下，我们提出了一个一般框架，以设置有限的临时（疫苗接种）中心，以平衡物理安全性和所需（疫苗）服务覆盖范围和有限的资源。我们将问题设置为中心操作员（防守者）和对手之间的Stackelberg游戏，其中一组中心不是先验修复的，而是决策输出的一部分。这导致混合组合和连续优化问题。作为我们对此问题的可扩展近似值的一部分，我们通过确定涉及离散变量和连续变量时确定切换最大和最小的一般二元性条件来提供基本贡献。我们执行详细的实验，以表明所提出的解决方案在实践中是可扩展的。
Vaccine delivery in under-resourced locations with security risks is not just challenging but also life threatening. The current COVID pandemic and the need to vaccinate have added even more urgency to this issue. Motivated by this problem, we propose a general framework to set-up limited temporary (vaccination) centers that balance physical security and desired (vaccine) service coverage with limited resources. We set-up the problem as a Stackelberg game between the centers operator (defender) and an adversary, where the set of centers is not fixed a priori but is part of the decision output. This results in a mixed combinatorial and continuous optimization problem. As part of our scalable approximation of this problem, we provide a fundamental contribution by identifying general duality conditions of switching max and min when both discrete and continuous variables are involved. We perform detailed experiments to show that the solution proposed is scalable in practice.
