论文标题
与成对比较偏好的社会决策计划中的激励措施
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences
论文作者
论文摘要
社会决策计划（SDSS）绘制了单个选民而不是多种替代方案的典型偏好，用于替代方案的概率分布。为了研究SDS的公理特性，我们提高了使用天然（但鲜为人知的）对彩票偏好的偏好（PC）偏好扩展。如果前者更有可能返回优先的结果，则该扩展名假设一个彩票比另一个彩票更优于另一个彩票。我们解决了Brandt（2017）提出的三个开放问题：（i）没有Condorcet一致的SD可满足PC-trategateproofness； （ii）没有匿名和中性的SD可满足PC效率和PC-STRATEGYPROVENS； （iii）没有满足PC效率和严格的PC参与的匿名和中性SD。所有三个不可能都需要$ m \ geq 4 $替代方案，并在$ m \ leq 3 $时变成可能性。此外，我们解决了Aziz等人提出的一个开放问题。 （2015年）表明，没有源自低效率的彩票的PC-改进路径可能会导致PC高效的彩票。
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over alternatives to preferences over lotteries using the natural -- but little understood -- pairwise comparison (PC) preference extension. This extension postulates that one lottery is preferred to another if the former is more likely to return a preferred outcome. We settle three open questions raised by Brandt (2017): (i) there is no Condorcet-consistent SDS that satisfies PC-strategyproofness; (ii) there is no anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies PC-efficiency and PC-strategyproofness; and (iii) there is no anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies PC-efficiency and strict PC-participation. All three impossibilities require $m\geq 4$ alternatives and turn into possibilities when $m\leq 3$. We furthermore settle an open problem raised by Aziz et al. (2015) by showing that no path of PC-improvements originating from an inefficient lottery may lead to a PC-efficient lottery.
