论文标题
确保抵御网络物理系统的隐秘攻击
Ensuring Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
本文提供了一种用于分析旨在实现对网络物理系统（CPSS）秘密或无法检测到的攻击的韧性的机制的工具。我们认为攻击者能够破坏系统的所有输入和输出。为了应对此类攻击者，必须实施响应方案，以防止攻击者在一定时间段内破坏系统的输入和输出。为了帮助设计这种响应方案，我们的工具为这段时间提供了足够的长度，以确保具有特定概率的安全性。我们提供了一个保守的上限，即该系统在违反安全限制之前可以在隐秘攻击中保持多长时间。此外，我们展示了检测器如何限制攻击者可以在系统上施加的偏见，同时仍然保持隐形，从而帮助系统操作员在检测器的设计中。我们的贡献以一个说明性的例子为例。
This article provides a tool for analyzing mechanisms that aim to achieve resilience against stealthy, or undetectable, attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We consider attackers who are able to corrupt all of the inputs and outputs of the system. To counter such attackers, a response scheme must be implemented that keeps the attacker from corrupting the inputs and outputs of the system for certain periods of time. To aid in the design of such a response scheme, our tool provides sufficient lengths for these periods of time in order to ensure safety with a particular probability. We provide a conservative upper bound on how long the system can remain under stealthy attack before the safety constraints are violated. Furthermore, we show how a detector limits the set of biases an attacker can exert on the system while still remaining stealthy, aiding a system operator in the design of the detector. Our contributions are demonstrated with an illustrative example.
