论文标题
时间依赖的效果阻碍了公共物品游戏的合作
Time-dependent effects hinder cooperation on the public goods game
论文作者
论文摘要
公共物品游戏是一个社会投资一些资产并恢复利润的典范，尽管也可以对生物学人群进行建模。在经典的公共物品游戏中，只有两种策略竞争：合作或缺陷；经常实施第三种策略来进行惩罚，这是促进合作的一种机制。游戏的条件可以具有动态性质，因此我们研究了时间依赖性效应，例如增强因素中的振荡，这说明了生产率随时间的变化。此外，我们继续研究对游戏的时间依赖性，并延迟惩罚时间。我们得出的结论是，对生产率和惩罚延迟的振荡都同意损害合作。
The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third strategy is often implemented to asses punishment, which is a mechanism to promote cooperation. The conditions of the game can be of a dynamical nature, therefore we study time-dependent effects such an as oscillation in the enhancement factor, which accounts for productivity changes over time. Furthermore, we continue to study time dependencies on the game with a delay on the punishment time. We conclude that both the oscillations on the productivity and the punishment delay concur in the detriment of cooperation.
