论文标题
无人机网络中多个联合学习服务的拍卖交易的拍卖交易
Auction-Promoted Trading for Multiple Federated Learning Services in UAV-Aided Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
联合学习(FL)代表了一个有希望的分布式机器学习范式,该范式允许智能设备通过提供本地数据集协作训练共享模型。但是,很少研究考虑多种共存的FL服务和不同类型的服务提供商的问题。在本文中,我们研究了无人机(UAV)辅助网络中的多个FL服务交易问题,FL服务需求(FLSDS)的目标是从可行的客户(例如智能设备,智能手机,智能手机,智能车辆)和从UAV中购买型号的汇总服务,以便满足其需求。建立了一个基于拍卖的交易市场,以促进三方的交易,即充当买家的FLSD,分布式的客户群体,充当数据销售商的客户群,以及无人用的无人机销售商。拟议的拍卖被正式化为0-1整数编程问题,旨在通过调查获胜者的确定和付款规则设计来最大化整体买家的收入。具体而言,由于考虑了两种卖方类型(数据销售商和无人机销售商),因此引入了一个有趣的想法,集成了卖方对和联合出价,这将不同的卖家变成了虚拟卖家对。分别提出了基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)基于基于匹配的机制,其中前者实现了最佳溶液,但是,这在计算上是棘手的。虽然后者可以获得次优的解决方案,但使用较低的计算复杂性,尤其是在考虑大量参与者时。对这两种机制,全面分析了诸如真实性和个人理性之类的重要特性。广泛的实验结果验证了这些特性,并证明我们提出的机制的表现明显优于代表性方法。
Federated learning (FL) represents a promising distributed machine learning paradigm that allows smart devices to collaboratively train a shared model via providing local data sets. However, problems considering multiple co-existing FL services and different types of service providers are rarely studied. In this paper, we investigate a multiple FL service trading problem in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-aided networks, where FL service demanders (FLSDs) aim to purchase various data sets from feasible clients (smart devices, e.g., smartphones, smart vehicles), and model aggregation services from UAVs, to fulfill their requirements. An auction-based trading market is established to facilitate the trading among three parties, i.e., FLSDs acting as buyers, distributed located client groups acting as data-sellers, and UAVs acting as UAV-sellers. The proposed auction is formalized as a 0-1 integer programming problem, aiming to maximize the overall buyers' revenue via investigating winner determination and payment rule design. Specifically, since two seller types (data-sellers and UAV-sellers) are considered, an interesting idea integrating seller pair and joint bid is introduced, which turns diverse sellers into virtual seller pairs. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-based, and one-sided matching-based mechanisms are proposed, respectively, where the former achieves the optimal solutions, which, however, is computationally intractable. While the latter can obtain suboptimal solutions that approach to the optimal ones, with low computational complexity, especially upon considering a large number of participants. Significant properties such as truthfulness and individual rationality are comprehensively analyzed for both mechanisms. Extensive experimental results verify the properties and demonstrate that our proposed mechanisms outperform representative methods significantly.